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Abstract Questions are triggers for explicit events of ‘issue management’. We
give a complete logic in dynamic-epistemic style for events of raising, refining,
and resolving an issue, all in the presence of information flow through obser-
vation or communication. We explore extensions of the framework to multi-
agent scenarios and long-term temporal protocols. We sketch a comparison
with some alternative accounts.
Keywords Question · Issue management · Logical dynamics
1 Introduction and Motivation
Questions are different from statements, but they are just as important in
driving reasoning, communication, and general processes of investigation. The
first logical studies merging questions and propositions seem to have come
from the Polish tradition: cf. [40]. A forceful modern defender of this dual
perspective is Hintikka, who has long pointed out how any form of inquiry
depends on an interplay of inference and answers to questions. Cf. [15] and
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[14] on the resulting ‘interrogative logic’, and the epistemological views behind
it. These logics are mainly about general inquiry and learning about the world.
But there is also a related stream of work on questions in natural language,
as important speech acts with a systematic linguistic vocabulary. Key names are
Groenendijk & Stokhof: cf. [10, 12], and the recent ‘inquisitive semantics’ of
[11] ties this in with a broader information-oriented ‘dynamic semantics’. Logic
of inquiry and logic of questions are related, but there are also differences in
thrust: a dynamic logic of ‘issue management’ that fits our intuitions is not
necessarily the same as a logic of speech acts that focuses on what natural
language provides.
In this paper, we do not choose between these streams, but we propose a
different technical approach. Our starting point is a simple observation. Ques-
tions are evidently important informational actions in human agency. Now the
latter area is the birth place of dynamic-epistemic logic of explicit events that
make information flow. But surprisingly, existing dynamic-epistemic systems
do not give an explicit account of what questions do. In fact, central examples
in the area have questions directing the information flow (say, by the Father in
the puzzle of the Muddy Children)—but the usual representations in systems
like PAL or DEL leave them out, and merely treat the answers, as events of
public announcement. Can we make questions themselves first-class citizens
in dynamic-epistemic logic, and get closer to the dynamics of inquiry? In
[4], Baltag has shown that we can. We will take this further, following a
methodology that has already worked in other areas, and pursuing the same
issues here: what are natural acts of inquiry, and how can dynamic logics bring
out their structure via suitable recursion axioms? Moreover, by doing so, we at
once get an account of non-factual questions, multi-agent scenarios, syntactic
aspects, temporal sequences, and other themes that have already been studied
in a DEL setting.
Overview Our analysis starts with Section 2 on a static logic of informa-
tion and public questions, a natural expansion of epistemic logic. Section 3
then identifies key dynamic actions of ‘issue management’, discusses some
of their properties, and presents a complete dynamic logic. We follow up
with two themes showing how this system leads to natural extensions: multi-
agent perspectives on public and private questions in Section 4, and temporal
protocols that regulate what questions can be asked (and answers can be
given) in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss where we stand with this ‘proof
of concept’, and which further directions look promising. Section 7 is a very
brief comparison with existing ‘logic of interrogation’ and ‘inquisitive logic’.
2 A Toy System of Information and Issues
The methodology of dynamic-epistemic logic starts with a static base logic
describing states of some informational phenomenon, and identifies relevant
informational state-changing events. Then, dynamic modalities are added to
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the base language, and their complete logic is determined on top of the given
logic of the static models. To work in the same style, we first need a convenient
static semantics to ‘dynamify’. We take such a model from existing semantics of
public questions, considering only one agent first, for simplicity. We will work
in the style of epistemic logic and public announcement logic PAL, though our
dynamic logic of questions will also have its differences.
2.1 Epistemic Issue Models
We work over standard epistemic models. In this setting, a simple framework
for representing questions uses an equivalence relation over some relevant
domain of alternatives, that we will call the ‘issue relation’. This idea is found
in many places, from linguistics (cf. [12]) to learning theory (cf. [19]): the
current ‘issue’ is a partition of the set of options, with partition cells standing
for the areas where we would like to be. This partition may be induced
by a conversation whose current focus are the issues that have been put
on the table, or a game where finding out about certain issues has become
important to further play, a learning scenario for the language fed to us by our
environment, or even a whole research program with an agenda determining
what is currently under investigation. The ‘alternatives’ or worlds may range
here from simple finite settings like deals in a card game to complex infinite
histories representing a total life experience. Formally, all this reduces to:
Definition 1 (Epistemic Issue Model) An epistemic issue model is a structure
M =〈W,∼,≈, V〉 where:
– W is a set of possible worlds or states (epistemic alternatives),
– ∼ is an equivalence relation on W (epistemic indistinguishability),
– ≈ is an equivalence relation on W (the abstract issue relation),
– V : P → ℘(W) is a valuation for atomic propositions p ∈ P.
We could introduce models with more general relations, to account for,
say, lack of epistemic introspection into the current issue, or belief instead
of knowledge. While this is important eventually, equivalence relations will
suffice for the points that we will make in this paper.
In Fig. 1 we illustrate the previous formal definition graphically. Here and
in subsequent diagrams, epistemic indistinguishability is represented by lines
linking possible worlds, and the issue relation is represented by partition cells.
We use the usual conventions and skip reflexive and transitive relations. We
assume that the actual world is the top left one and in some cases, we will use
double lines instead of partition cells to represent issue relations. With this
understanding, Fig. 1 depicts, from left to right, an epistemic issue model in
which nothing is known and everything is an issue, a second one in which q is
known in the actual world and the issue is to find out about p, and, finally, one
in which everything is known in the actual world, and nothing is an issue.
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Fig. 1 Examples of epistemic issue models
2.2 Information and Issues: Language and Semantics
To work with these structures, we need matching modalities in our language.
Here we make a minimal choice of modal and epistemic logic for state spaces
plus two modalities describing the issue structure. First, Kϕ talks about knowl-
edge or semantic information of an agent, its informal reading is ‘ϕ is known’,
and its explanation is as usual: ‘ϕ holds in all epistemically indistinguishable
worlds’. To describe our models a bit further, we add a universal modality Uϕ
saying that ‘ϕ is true in all worlds’. Next, we use Qϕ to say that, locally in a
given world, the current structure of the issue-relation has ϕ true: ‘ϕ holds in all
issue-equivalent worlds’. While convenient, this local notion does not express
the global assertion that the current issue is ϕ, which will be defined later.
Finally, we find a need for a notion that mixes the epistemic and issue
relations, talking (roughly) about what would be the case if the issue were
resolved given what we already know. Technically, we add an intersection
modality Rϕ saying that “ϕ holds in all epistemically indistinguishable and
issue equivalent worlds”. While such modalities are frequent in many settings,
they complicate axiomatization. We will assume the standard device of adding
nominals naming single worlds (cf. [9, 20] for recent instances of this technique
in the DEL setting).1
Definition 2 (Static Language) The language LELQ(P,N) has disjoint count-
able sets P and N of propositions and nominals, respectively, with p ∈ P, i ∈ N.
Its formulas are defined by the following inductive syntax rule:
i | p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Uϕ | Kϕ | Qϕ | Rϕ
When needed, dual existential modalities ̂U , ̂K, ̂Q and ̂R are defined as usual.
Shortcuts to express disjunction and other boolean connectives are also used
1As one illustration, working with nominals requires a modified valuation function in Definition
1, to a V : P unionmulti N → ℘(W) mapping every proposition p ∈ P to a set of states V(p) ⊆ W, but every
nominal i ∈ N to a singleton set V(i) = w of a world w ∈ W.
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in their standard way. Formulas in this static language receive their meaning in
the following way:
Definition 3 (Interpretation) Formulas are interpreted in models M at worlds
w by the following recursive clauses:
M |=w p iff w ∈ V(p), M |=w i iff w ∈ V(i),
M |=w ¬ϕ iff not M |=w ϕ, M |=w ϕ ∧ ψ iff M |=w ϕ and M |=w ψ,
M |=w Uϕ iff for all w ∈ W : M |=w ϕ,
M |=w Kϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w ∼ v implies M |=v ϕ,
M |=w Qϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w ≈ v implies M |=v ϕ,
M |=w Rϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w (∼∩≈) v implies M |=v ϕ.
For instance, with this language we can express that the structure of the
current issue settles fact ϕ with the following formula:
U(Qϕ ∨ Q¬ϕ)2
Here is how we say that an agent considers it possible that fact ϕ is not




The next example says that an agent knows locally that a certain fact ϕ would
be settled by the issue, while it is not settled globally:
KQϕ ∧ ¬U (Qϕ ∨ Q¬ϕ)
As for the third modality of ‘resolution’, it describes intuitively what agents
would know if the current issue is resolved. Thus, we can say that in the current
epistemic situation ϕ is neither known by the agent nor settled by the structure
of the issue, but it is true upon resolution:
¬Qϕ ∧ ¬Kϕ ∧ Rϕ
A more complex example is when a fact is neither known nor settled in any
world of the model, but it is true in all indistinguishable and issue-equivalent
worlds, and it would be settled by a resolution action:
¬̂U(Kϕ ∨ Qϕ) ∧ U Rϕ
These examples show that our language can express quite complex notions
about questions. Many such notions have been considered in the literature
2We use the term ‘settling’ in a technical sense, as saying that the issue answers (either explicitly
or implicitly) the question whether ϕ holds. In natural language, there is also the notion of ‘settling
an issue’, an event of finding out which partition cell we are in. This will be one of our later actions
of ‘issue management’, that of resolution.
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about questions and information flow, but often restricted to factual questions,










We end with a technical point: the intersection modality Rϕ cannot be
defined in terms of K and Q. In particular, ̂Rϕ is not equivalent with ̂Kϕ ∧ ̂Qϕ,
witness the counterexample above. However, the use of ‘nominals’ i from
hybrid logic helps us to completeness, by the valid converse:
̂K(i ∧ ϕ) ∧ ̂Q(i ∧ ϕ) → ̂Rϕ
2.3 Static Logic of Information and Issues
As for reasoning with our language, we have the valid implications ̂Kϕ → ̂Uϕ,
̂Qϕ → ̂Uϕ, ̂Rϕ → ̂Uϕ. The following are not, in general, valid implications
Rϕ → Qϕ, Rϕ → ¬Qϕ, Kϕ → Qϕ, Qϕ → Kϕ, Rϕ → Kϕ.
More generally, we write |= ϕ if the static formula ϕ is true in every model
at every world. The static epistemic logic ELQ of information and questions in
our models is the set of all validities:
ELQ =
{
ϕ ∈ LELQ : |= ϕ
}
Definition 4 (Axiomatization) The proof system ELQ contains the customary
(epistemic) S5 axioms for K, Q and R:
1. Kp → p (Truth), Kp → KKp, ¬Kp → K¬Kp (Full Introspection)
2. p → Q ̂Qp, p → ̂Qp, ̂Q ̂Qp → ̂Qp (equivalence relation for issues),
3. p → R̂Rp, p → ̂Rp, ̂R̂Rp → ̂Rp (equivalence relation for resolution),
together with the characteristic axiom for intersection:
4. ̂Ki ∧ ̂Qi ↔ ̂Ri.
In addition, it contains a standard hybrid logic with a universal modality:
5. (p → q) → (p → q), ∈ {U, K, R, Q} (Distribution)
6. ¬¬p ↔ p,, ∈ {U, K, R, Q} (Duality)
7. p → U ̂U p, p → ̂U p, ̂U ̂U p → ̂U p, ̂Ui,p → ̂U p, ∈ {̂K, ̂R, ̂Q},
8. (i ∧ p)→(i → p),∈ {U, K, R, Q} (Nominals)
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9. From PC ϕ infer ϕ (Prop), From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ (M P)
10. From ϕ infer ϕ, for  ∈ {U, K, R, Q} (Necessitation)
11. From ϕ and σsort(ϕ)= ψ infer ψ , where σsort is ‘sorted’ 3
12. From i → ϕ infer ϕ, for i not occurring in ϕ
13. From ̂U(i ∧  j) → ̂U( j ∧ ϕ) infer ̂U(i ∧ ϕ), for  ∈ {̂K, ̂R, ̂Q}, i = j,
and j not occurring in ϕ.
We write ELQ ϕ if ϕ is provable in the proof system ELQ. These laws of
reasoning derive many intuitive principles. For instance, here is the simple
proof that agents have introspection about the current public issue:
U(Qp ∨ Q¬p) ELQ UU(Qp ∨ Q¬p) ELQ KU(Qp ∨ Q¬p)
Here are some simple derivable principles connecting our modalities:
Uϕ → Kϕ, Uϕ → Qϕ, Uϕ → Rϕ Kϕ → Rϕ, Qϕ → Rϕ
Further technical details of proofs are irrelevant to our purposes here. We
refer to [23] for hybrid modal proof systems and completeness theorems. This
standard machinery leads to the expected result:
Theorem 1 (Completeness of ELQ) For every formula ϕ ∈ LELQ(P,N):
|= ϕ if and only if ELQ ϕ
3 Dynamic Logic of Issue Management
In dynamic epistemic logic, the next step is now to identify basic events of
information flow, and expand the logic accordingly. This situation is very
analogous with logic of questions and events of ‘issue management’.
3.1 Basic Actions of Issue Management
To identify basic actions that change the issue relation in a given model, we
first look at some pictures. For simplicity, we start with the initial issue as the
universal relation, represented as a frame border.
In Fig. 2, the first transition records the effect of asking a question: the issue
relation is split into p and ¬p cells. The second transition illustrates the effect
of asking a second question: the issue partition is further refined.
In Fig. 3, the first transition is an announcement: the indistinguishability
links between p and ¬p worlds are removed. The second transition shows
how a second announcement further refines the epistemic partition. Here and
3The technical notion ‘sorted’ and its uses are explained in [23].
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Fig. 2 Effects of asking yes/no questions
henceforth, we use a special sort of event that is congenial to this setting, viz.
the link-cutting announcements ϕ! of van Benthem and Liu [31]. These do not
throw away worlds, but merely cut all links between ϕ- and ¬ϕ-worlds, keeping
the whole model available for further reference.
In this way, there is a symmetry between a question and a soft announce-
ment. One refines the issue, the other the information partition:
Definition 5 (Questions & Announcements) Let
ϕ≡M = {(w, v) | ‖ϕ‖Mw =
‖ϕ‖Mv }. Executing action ϕ? in M results in Mϕ? = 〈Wϕ?,∼ϕ?,≈ϕ?, Vϕ?〉, while
a ϕ! action results in Mϕ! = 〈Wϕ!,∼ϕ!,≈ϕ!, Vϕ!〉, where we put:
Wϕ? = W Wϕ! = W
∼ϕ? = ∼ ∼ϕ! = ∼∩ ϕ≡M
≈ϕ? = ≈ ∩ ϕ≡M ≈ϕ! = ≈
Vϕ? = V Vϕ! = V
The symmetry in this mechanism would be lost if we let p! be an executable
action only if it is truthful. For, the corresponding question p? is executable in
every world in a model, even those not satisfying p. The results that will follow
can easily be stated for both kinds of announcement: truthful or not.
One attractive feature of this setting is that it suggests further natural
operations on information and issues. In particular, Fig. 4 contains two more
management actions. In the first example two Yes/No questions p? and q? are
asked, and then a global resolving action follows on the epistemic relation. In
the second, two announcements p! and q! are made, and a ref inement action
Fig. 3 Almost symmetrical effects of ‘Soft’ announcing
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Fig. 4 Resolving and refining actions
follows on the issue relation, adjusting it to what agents already know. These
operations are natural generalizations of asking and announcing:
Definition 6 (Resolution and Refinement) An execution of the ‘resolve’ ac-
tion !, and of the ‘refine’ action ? in model M results in changed models
M! = 〈W!,∼!,≈!, V!〉, M? = 〈W?,∼?,≈?, V?〉, respectively, with:
W? = W W! = W
∼? = ∼ ∼! = ∼∩ ≈
≈? = ≈ ∩ ∼ ≈! = ≈
V? = V V! = V
Again, the two actions are symmetric. As a way of understanding this, we
could introduce a new agent whose role is that of an ‘issue manager’, dual to
the epistemic information agent.
It is also useful to have one more issue management action # that simul-
taneously changes both equivalence relations.4 The effect of executing this in
model M is a new model M# = 〈W#,∼#,≈#, V#〉 with:
W# = W, ∼# =≈# =∼ ∩ ≈, V# = V
Here is a summary of our repertoire of issue management actions:
[ϕ !] ‘Soft’ announcement [ϕ?] Question
[ ! ] Resolution [ ? ] Refinement
[#] Simultaneous resolution or ‘parallel refinement’
4Eric Pacuit (p.c.) has suggested that there may also be natural actions of simplifying a current
issue, which would result in coarsening the current partition.
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3.2 Semantic Properties of Issue Management
Our basic actions satisfy some intuitive principles. In particular, our three last
ones form an algebra under composition, witness the following table:
; ! ? #
! ! # #
? # ? #
# # # #
With more specific management actions of questions and announcements,
the picture is more diverse. In particular, composing these operations is
complex, and many prima facie laws do not hold, for instance:
Fact 1 (Composition) The following equations are not valid in DELQ:
(11) ϕ!; ! = !;ϕ! (12) ϕ!; ? = ?;ϕ! (13) ϕ!; # = #;ϕ!
(14) ϕ?; ! = !;ϕ! (15) ϕ?; ? = ?;ϕ! (16) ϕ?; # = #;ϕ?
(17) ϕ?;ψ ! = ψ !;ϕ?
Proof The following table lists simple counter-examples, with the following
understanding. Each line presents a three-world static starting model i, j, k with
information cells between round brackets (, ) and issue cells between square
brackets [, ]. The relevant formulas use nominals for the worlds. unionsq
No. EIM ϕ ψ
11 ([ij ][k]) ̂Kk ∧ ̂Q j ∧ ¬i
12 [(ij )(k)] ̂Qk ∧ ̂K j ∧ ¬i
13 ([ij ])([k]) i
14 ([ijk]) i
15 [(ijk)] j
16 ([ij ])([k]) i
17 ([ijk]) i ̂Ri
Some of these examples crucially involve non-factual formulas. For in-
stance, ϕ?;ψ ! = ψ !;ϕ? and ϕ?;ψ? = ϕ? · ψ? only fail for formulas ϕ with
non-factual content. They are both valid for factual ϕ. This is so because
VM = Vϕ? = Vϕ!: the valuation function remains unchanged after questioning
actions. Then, by a simple inductive argument, for old models M and updated
M′, we have ψM = ψM′ for all purely propositional formulas ψ : essentially,
their extensions in epistemic-issue models are independent of epistemic or
issue structure.
Next, let us see how some known features of information flow in public
announcement logic PAL fare with our issue management actions.
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Repetition In PAL, repeating the same assertion !ϕ has no new effects when
its content ϕ is factual. But as the Muddy Children puzzle shows, repeating
the same epistemic assertion can be informative, and lead to new effects, or
in the above short-hand notation: ϕ! ;ϕ! = ϕ! The reason is that when the
model has changed, epistemic operators may change truth values. What about
DELQ: is asking a question once the same as asking it twice? Again, for factual
questions, this is clearly so, given the above semantics: the issue relation no
longer changes in the second step. But when the question itself can refer to the
issue relation, things are different:
Fact 2 (Iteration) The equation ϕ?;ϕ? = ϕ? is invalid in DELQ.
Proof Take ξ := ( ̂Qi → ( j ∨ k)) ∧ (( ̂Q j ∧ p) → ̂Qi). Two successive updates
with this question, computed as above, each change a model with three worlds
i, j, k, a universal issue relation, and p true at k. unionsq
Composition Next comes a difference with PAL. Public announcement sat-
isfies the valid composition principle: ϕ!;ψ ! = (ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ)! It was observed in
[31] and [30], that this does not hold for more complex model changes.5
Fact 3 (Proper Iteration) There is no question composition principle.
Proof If there were one single assertion having just the same effect as a
sequence ϕ?;ψ?, then, starting with the issue configured as the universal
relation on the domain of a model, such a sequence will always induce a two,
not four, element partition; this refutation is also depicted in Fig. 4.6 unionsq
Related to this are dynamic properties of ordering. While action order
makes no difference with purely factual assertions or questions, it does when
the content may be of an explicit epistemic or issue-related nature.
We have seen that information update and questions have many subtleties.
It is time for a dynamic epistemic logic of issues that can reason about these.
3.3 Issue Management: Language and Semantics
In order to talk explicitly about the above changes, dynamic modalities are
added to the earlier static language of information and issues:
Definition 7 (Dynamic Language) Language LDELQ(P,N) is defined by adding
the following clauses to Definition 2: [ϕ!]ψ | [ϕ?]ψ | [?]ϕ | [ ! ]ϕ.
5The composition principle also fails in PAL with protocols, our topic in Section 6.
6This Fact is not a big obstacle. We could easily extend our language with multiple questions, that
do not just change partitions on a single-formula basis.
644 J. van Benthem, S¸. Minica˘
These are interpreted by adding the following clauses to Definition 3:
Definition 8 (Interpretation) Formulas are interpreted in M at w by the
following clauses, where models Mϕ?, Mϕ!, M? and M! are as defined above:
M |=w [ϕ?]ψ iff Mϕ? |=w ψ, M |=w [ϕ!]ψ iff Mϕ! |=w ψ,
M |=w [!]ψ iff M! |=w ψ, M |=w [?]ψ iff M? |=w ψ,
Interesting relations between knowledge, questions and answers can be
expressed in our language. We can, for instance, say that a question ψ?





We can also say that a sequence of questions entails ψ? using:
U
([ϕ0?] · · · [ϕn?]̂Qi → [ϕ0?] · · · [ϕn?][ψ?]̂Qi
)
7 for all nominals i
We can also express new notions of entailment, like, for instance, the notion of
epistemic global entailment of an arbitrary announcement ψ !:
U
(
̂Ri → [ψ !]̂Ri) for all nominals i
A small modification of this in which we relax the previous requirement of
abstract global entailment can capture local compliance of answers:
[ϕ0?] · · · [ϕn?]
(
ψ ∧ ̂Ri) → [ϕ0?] · · · [ϕn?][ψ !]̂Ri8 for all nominals i
Moreover, our language can express basic laws of interrogative reasoning.
For instance, we can say that an agent knows in advance that the effect of a
question followed by its resolution leads to knowledge of the relevant issue:
K[ϕ?][ ! ]U(Kϕ ∨ K¬ϕ)
3.4 Dynamic Logic of Informational Issues
We have seen that effects of asking questions are not always easy to keep
straight, but also, that there is an interesting structure to management oper-
ations on models. Both purposes call for a complete dynamic epistemic logic
7This generalizes standard definitions of entailment restricted to factual questions.
8Again, this generalizes notions of compliance restricted to propositional formulas.
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of questions. Satisfaction and validity are defined as before. The dynamic
epistemic logic of questioning is the set of all semantic validities:
DELQ = {ϕ ∈ LDELQ(P,N) : |= ϕ}
We introduce a proof system by adding the reduction axioms below to the
earlier proof system ELQ for the static fragment of the logic.
What follows is a list of mostly operator commutation laws, plus clauses
with crucial shifts (items 6, 7, 12, 19, 20, 28). This reflects the workings of our
semantics of information and issue management:
Definition 9 (Reduction Axioms) The proof system DELQ extends the earlier
static logic ELQ by the following reduction axioms and inference rule:
1. [ϕ?]a ↔ a (Asking & Atoms)
2. [ϕ?]¬ψ ↔ ¬[ϕ?]ψ (Asking & Negation)
3. [ϕ?](ψ ∧ χ) ↔ [ϕ?]ψ ∧ [ϕ?]χ (Asking & Conjunction)
4. [ϕ?]Uψ ↔ U[ϕ?]ψ (Asking & Universal Modality)
5. [ϕ?]Kψ ↔ K[ϕ?]ψ (Asking & Knowledge)
6. [ϕ?]Rψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ R(ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ R(¬ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ))
(Asking&Resolution)
7. [ϕ?]Qψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ Q(ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ Q(¬ϕ →
[ϕ?]ψ)) (Asking&Partition)
8–11. The same as items 1 to 4 with [!] instead of [ϕ?].
12. [ ! ]Kϕ ↔ R[ ! ]ϕ (Resolving & Knowledge)
13. [ ! ]Rϕ ↔ R[ ! ]ϕ (Resolving & Resolution)
14. [ ! ]Qϕ ↔ Q[ ! ]ϕ (Resolving & Partition)
15–18. The same as items 1 to 4 with [ϕ!] instead of [ϕ?].
19. [ϕ!]Kψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ K(ϕ → [ϕ!]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ K(¬ϕ →
[ϕ!]ψ)) (Answer & Knowledge)9
20. [ϕ!]Rψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ R(ϕ → [ϕ!]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ R(¬ϕ →
[ϕ!]ψ)) (Answer & Resolution)
21. [ϕ!]Qψ ↔ Q[ϕ!]ψ (Announcement & Partition)
22–25. The same as items 1 to 4 with [?] instead of [ϕ?].
26. [ ? ]Kϕ ↔ K[ ? ]ϕ (Ref ining & Knowledge)
27. [ ? ]Rϕ ↔ R[ ? ]ϕ (Ref ining & Resolution)
28. [ ? ]Qϕ ↔ R[ ? ]ϕ (Ref ining & Partition)
29. From ϕ infer ϕ, for  ∈ {[·?], [·!], [!], [?]} (Necessitation)
We write DELQ ϕ if ϕ is provable in the proof system DELQ.
Theorem 2 (Soundness) The reduction axioms in DELQ are sound.
9If we assume truthfulness as a precondition of executing an announcement action this axiom
(and other ones with a similar structure) does not need the right disjunct and will correspond to
the standard DEL axioms for announcement.
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Proof By standard modal arguments. We discuss two cases. Asking & Parti-
tion explains how questions refine a partition:
[ϕ?]Qψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ Q(ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ Q(¬ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ))
Assume that M |=w [ϕ?]Qψ , then we also have Mϕ? |=w Qψ . If M |=w ϕ, the
new issue relation locally refined the old one to ϕ-worlds, and hence we get the
left-hand disjunct on the right. The other case yields the right-hand disjunct.
The preceding explanation also works in the opposite direction.
Our second illustration (Resolving & Knowledge) shows how resolution
changes knowledge making crucial use of our intersection modality:
[ ! ]Kϕ ↔ R[ ! ]ϕ
M |=w [ ! ]Kϕ is equivalent to M! |=w Kϕ, which is equivalent to ∀v ∈ W! :
w ∼! v implies M! |=v ϕ. As ∼! =∼∩≈, the semantics of our dynamic modality
tells us that ∀v ∈ W : w (∼∩≈) v implies M |=v [ ! ]ϕ, which is equivalent to
M |=w R[ ! ]ϕ, as desired. unionsq
Theorem 3 (Completeness of DELQ) For every formula ϕ ∈ LDELQ(P,N):
|= ϕ if and only if DELQ ϕ.
Proof This is a standard DEL-style translation argument. Working inside out,
the reduction axioms translate dynamic formulas into corresponding static
ones. At the end, completeness for the static base logic is invoked.10 unionsq
3.5 Discussion
So far we have given a logic of information and questions in standard DEL
style. This calculus can derive many further principles, for instance:
The following formula is provable for all factual ϕ: ϕ → [ϕ?][!]Kϕ.
Proof 11
1 ϕ → (ϕ ∧ R(ϕ → ϕ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ R(¬ϕ → ϕ)) PC
2 ϕ → (ϕ ∧ R(ϕ → [ϕ?]ϕ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ R(¬ϕ → [ϕ?]ϕ)) Factual ϕ
3 ϕ → [ϕ?]Rϕ Ak & R
4 ϕ → [ϕ?]R[!]ϕ Factual ϕ
5 ϕ → [ϕ?][!]Kϕ Rs & K
unionsq
10In more detail, one needs a proof rule of Replacement of Provable Equivalents which is sound in
our system. Note that this is not a Substitution Rule, which fails in DEL.
11Here and elsewhere, we need an earlier observation, now restated as: Fact: For factual formulas
ϕ, with q ranging over management actions, [q]ϕ ↔ ϕ is provable. One uses the Action & Atoms
axioms for the base case and the Action & Negation or Action & Conjunction axioms for the
inductive steps.
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Fig. 5 ϕ = Q¬Kp
Several steps here depend on ϕ being factual. They can fail otherwise as
shown in Fig. 5.
The complex formula Q¬Kp is true initially in every world of the model,
but this is not the case anymore after a ϕ? question plus a resolution action [!].
Such changes are not always easy to keep straight, but our logic keeps track
of the present, and even more complex cases. But our analysis really shows
its power (compared with other approaches to questions) when we consider
multi-agent scenarios and protocols for investigation. These extensions will be
taken up in the next two sections.
However, we end with a remaining issue right at the present level:
Hidden Validities Like with PAL, the current axiomatization leave
unfinished business. While reduction axioms work on a formula-by-formula
basis, they need not describe the general schematic laws of the system, such
as the earlier composition law for consecutive assertions, that hold under
arbitrary substitutions of formulas for proposition letters.12 This deficit be-
comes even more urgent here, however, similar techniques can be applied
in the present setting. We saw that our model-changing operations of issue
management had a nice algebraic structure. For instance, it is easy to see that
resolving is idempotent and commutes with refinement:
! ; ! = ! and ! ; ? = ?; !.
But our axiomatization for DELQ does not state such laws explicitly,
since, by working only from innermost occurrences of dynamic modalities, the
completeness argument needed no recursion axioms with stacked modalities
like [!] [!]. Yet this sort of sequential information is obviously of great interest
for a logic of issue management, and thus, we end with an
Open Problem Find a complete description for the schematic validities of our
dynamic logic of issue management.
12The above reduction axioms for atoms typically lack this substitution property—though most
complex reduction axioms do. For PAL, the long-standing open problem whether schematic
validity is decidable has been solved in the affirmative in [16].
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4 Multi-Agent Scenarios: Public Versions
Questions typically involve more than one agent—and hence our restriction
to single agents so far misses much of the action. In the following sections we
will study multi-agent question scenarios. This is done in two stages: public
questions first, and after that, questions with different informational powers
for different agents.
4.1 Static Multi-Agent Logic of Information and Issues
The first step is routine. A static language and semantics with many agents
follow entirely standard lines, taking A to be a set of agents. First we modify
Definition 1 to get richer epistemic issue models:
Definition 10 (Epistemic Issue Model) An epistemic issue model is a structure
M =〈W, a∼, a≈, V〉 where W and V are as in Definition 1 and a ∈ A:
–
a∼ is an equivalence relation on W (epistemic indistinguishability),
–
a≈ is an equivalence relation on W (agent-issue equivalence).
Definition 11 (Static Language) The languageLELQm(P,N,A) has a new count-
able set of labels representing agents A, with a ∈ A. Its formulas are defined by
the following inductive syntax rule:
i | p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Uϕ | Kaϕ | Qaϕ | Raϕ
Existential modalities ̂Ka, ̂Qa and ̂Ra are again defined as usual.
Definition 12 (Interpretation) Formulas are interpreted in models M at
worlds w by recursion using the same clauses as Definition 3 for atoms,
Boolean and universal combinations, plus the following indexed modal ones:
M |=w Kaϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w a∼ v implies M |=v ϕ,
M |=w Qaϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w a≈ v implies M |=v ϕ,
M |=w Raϕ iff for all v ∈ W : w ( a∼∩ a≈) v implies M |=v ϕ.
This language can make agent-dependent distinctions. E.g., it can say that a
fact ϕ is an issue for some agents and not for others:
U(Qaϕ ∨ Qa¬ϕ) ∧ ¬U(Qbϕ ∨ Qb¬ϕ)
It can also say that one agent’s information is linked with issues for another:
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It can also describe much more deeply intertwined knowledge and issues.
Next, we need to bring out the dynamics. We first consider public actions as
before. These lead to an immediate generalization of earlier results:
Theorem 4 (Completeness for Public Multi-Agent DELQ) The logic of multi-
agent epistemic questions is completely axiomatizable.
Proof The proof consists in suitable agent labeling of earlier reduction axioms.
We just illustrate this routine generalization with the indexed versions of two
previous axioms (Answer & Knowledge and Asking & Partition):
[ϕ!]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ Ka(ϕ → [ϕ!]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ Ka(¬ϕ → [ϕ!]ψ)),
[ϕ?]Qaψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ Qa(ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ Qa(¬ϕ → [ϕ?]ψ))
unionsq
Remark on Groups Our static language only contains issue modalities for
single agents. But like in epistemic logic, groups of agents have inquiry-related
behavior of their own. Thus, a full treatment would require group notions of
information (such as common and distributed knowledge), and operators for
‘collective issues’ owned by groups rather than individuals.
4.2 Agent-Specific Questions and Preconditions
So far, we only had impersonal public questions among many agents. Now we
must consider real questions, as asked by one agent to another. As everywhere
in this paper, we restrict attention to propositional questions:13
b asks a: ‘Is ϕ the case?’
Thus, real ‘agency’ enters when we consider the structure of question acts. But
does this call for new management actions?
Consider an analogy with public announcement logic PAL. Real speech acts
of announcement, too, are agent-relative: ‘b tells a that ϕ’. But one usually
performs a reduction here: saying that ϕ is treated as an impersonal public
announcement of the conversational precondition of this event.
What that precondition is may depend on one’s pragmatic theory. But it will
usually involve agent-oriented facts such as:
‘b knows ϕ’, and perhaps even: ‘b believes that a does not know that ϕ’.
13Extension to other types, such as Wh-questions, seems straightforward to us, though it would
need a predicate-logical version of dynamic-epistemic logics.
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Thus, agents come in through impersonal public announcement of agent-
dependent preconditions.14 Some common multi-agent preconditions are:
1. ‘b asks ϕ’ presupposes ¬Kbϕ ∧ ¬Kb¬ϕ: that is, the questioner must not
know the answer to the question she asks,
2. ‘b asks ϕ to a’ presupposes ̂Kb (Kaϕ ∨ Ka¬ϕ): that is, the questioner must
consider it possible that the questionee knows the answer.
These make sense for truly informative Gricean questions, and there may
be other preconditions. For instance, asking a question usually suggests that
one wants to know the answer. But of course, questions come in many
varieties. Rhetorical questions by a teacher to the students do not convey
that the teacher does not know the answer, and they definitely do not sug-
gest that the teacher is under any illusions whether the students know the
answer.
Such typology of questions: ‘plain’, ‘rhetorical’, ‘Socratic’, is not a task for
logic, however. Indeed, a language of the sort we have developed here can
formulate lots of different preconditions, and logic is neutral on any choice
between them.15 The only thing our logic needs to do at this stage is keep track
of possible preconditions for agent-related questioning actions
ϕ? ba : ‘b asks ϕ to a’.
We assume that some precondition pre(ϕ? ba ) is given for this, and likewise,
a pre(ϕ! ba ) for an act of b ’s saying that ϕ to a. Then we can formulate
management actions and their dynamic logic along standard lines:
Definition 13 (Questioning Actions) Executing ϕ? ba in M gives a new model
Mϕ?ba = 〈Wϕ?ba ,
c∼ϕ?ba ,
c≈ϕ?ba , Vϕ?ba 〉. Likewise, ϕ! ba leads to a new model Mϕ!ba =
〈Wϕ!ba ,
c∼ϕ!ba ,
c≈ϕ!ba , Vϕ!ba 〉. ‘Resolution’ and ‘refinement’ are as before:




a )≡M c∼ϕ!ba =
c∼ ∩ pre(ϕ!
b
a )≡M ∩ ϕ≡M
c≈ϕ?ba =
c≈ ∩ ϕ≡M c≈ϕ!ba =
c≈
Vϕ?ba = V Vϕ!ba = V
14The same is true if we add further agent-dependent aspects of taking what is said, such as the
reliability that a assigns to the source b . This may be reflected in degrees of ‘softness’ of the signal
ϕ, as in dynamic logics of belief revision (cf. [26]). We will not pursue this here, since reliability
seems to play less of a role in the process of raising issues. But similar phenomena would come up
if one gave speakers ‘authority’ in raising issues.
15Our further issue management actions like resolution, refinement, or their parallel execution
may also have multi-agent preconditions. We do not pursue these here.
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Fig. 6 Dealing with agency using epistemic preconditions when asking agent dependent question
(p∧q)? in multi-agent epistemic-issue environment
In this definition, assertions refine the epistemic relation by means of their
preconditions and also by their content. In our link-cutting version, this refines
the given relation into 4 equivalence classes.16 Questions act differently: they
refine the issue relation with their content, but they also refine the epistemic
relation through the information in their precondition. Our clauses capture
these ideas formally.
Example 1 (Solving a Question by Raising It) This multi-agent semantics
can deal with interesting phenomena. For instance, the combination of
preconditions and issue change can have surprising effects which go be-
yond mere refinement of the issue relation. In particular, agents can solve
a question by raising it. Consider the example in Fig. 6 where by ask-
ing a question a simultaneously gives b the answer to the very issue that
he raises. Here agent a asks the question Q = (p ∧ q)? to agent b , with
the standard yes/no answers {A0, A1} and the following combined epis-
temic preconditions pre(Q) = ¬(Ka(p ∧ q) ∨ ¬Ka(p ∧ q)) ∧ ̂Ka(Kb (p ∧ q) ∨
Kb¬(p ∧ q)), pre(A1(Q)) = p ∧ q ∧ pre(Q), and pre(A0(Q)) = ¬(p ∧ q) ∧
pre(Q). Much more complex scenarios can be dealt with, but this will give the
flavour.
4.3 Dynamic Language, Logic, and Some Design Issues
Now we can add a dynamic language as usual, and interpret it over multi-agent
epistemic issue models. This proceeds just as before in Section 3.3.
Theorem 5 There is a complete dynamic logic with reduction axioms for public
multi-agent questions extending the single-agent one of Section 3.4.
16With world-eliminating announcements, we could just restrict the domain to the worlds satisfy-
ing one formula: the conjunction of the content and the precondition.
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Proof We only display here the three key reduction axioms:
(Asking & Knowledge), where χ = pre(ϕ? ba ):
[ϕ?ba ]Kcψ ↔ (χ ∧ Kc(χ → [ϕ?ba ]ψ)) ∨ (¬χ ∧ Kc(¬χ → [ϕ?ba ]ψ)),
(Asking & Intersection): [ϕ?ba ]Rcψ ↔
∨
i{χi ∧ Rc(χi → [ϕ?ba ]ψ)},
χi ∈ {pre(ϕ? ba ) ∧ ϕ,¬pre(ϕ? ba ) ∧ ϕ,pre(ϕ? ba ) ∧ ¬ϕ,¬pre(ϕ? ba ) ∧ ¬ϕ}
(Announcement & Knowledge): [ϕ!ba ]Kcψ ↔
∨
i{χi ∧ Kc(χi → [ϕ!ba ]ψ)},
χi ∈ {pre(ϕ! ba ) ∧ ϕ,¬pre(ϕ! ba ) ∧ ϕ,pre(ϕ! ba ) ∧ ¬ϕ,¬pre(ϕ! ba ) ∧ ¬ϕ}
The overall completeness argument runs exactly like before. unionsq
A similar completeness theorem can be proved with slightly modified
axioms for the usual world-eliminating announcement actions.
But modified dynamics make sense, too. Our treatment of questions
amounts to a parallel operation on epistemic issue models: we change epistemic
accessibility and the issue relation at the same time, using the precondition of
the question and its content, respectively. An alternative might be to do this
sequentially—but then, for complex questions, updating with the precondition
might change the model in a way that affects the subsequent change in the
issue relation. The two approaches are not the same and the parallel version is
closer to the intuitive effect of a question.17
5 Product Update for Multi-Agent DELQ
Now we move to the full range of epistemic dynamics: informational ac-
tions that involve different informational powers for agents, ranging from
differences in public abilities to privacy and hiding. These same phenomena
make sense with questions and issue management. There may be differences
in agents’ powers, and questions can be private just as well as observations.
And mixtures can occur, too: a question may be public, but the answer partly
private, or an answer may be public, and the question private. Indeed, in the
setting of social interaction or even scientific inquiry, subtle distinctions of this
sort make sense.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of product update
for static epistemic models M with so-called ‘event models’ E, the dynamic-
epistemic mechanism appropriate to this setting (cf. the classic paper [5]).18 In
17Moreover, our system has some independent technical interest, adding a new program operation
of parallel execution to dynamic-epistemic logic.
18Here are the basics in a nutshell. An event model E consists of a set of relevant events related
by epistemic uncertainty links that encode agents’ observational powers. Moreover, each event
comes with a ‘precondition’ stating just when it can occur: these drive the information flow when
events are observed. This shows in forming a product model M × E consisting of all pairs (s, e) of
old worlds s ∈ M that satisfy the precondition for event e. The new knowledge of agents is encoded
in the new uncertainty relation between pairs, which goes by the ‘product rule’: (s, e) ∼ (t, f ) iff
s ∼ e and e ∼ f . Finally, the valuation for proposition letters at (s, e) remains the same as that as
s: at least in the simple DEL systems that we discuss here, there is no factual change.
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Fig. 7 Question p? in a single-agent epistemic-issue structure
this section, we will merely sketch how this method can be extended to include
issue management.
The main idea is simply this: we add issue relations to static epistemic
models, but also to epistemic event models. It then turns out that the usual
product update rule makes sense for both kinds of relation—though there are
interesting new points of interpretation and application.
5.1 A Simple Motivating Example
Before defining a formal counterpart to product update in our new setting, let
us discuss what needs to be done, starting from the basic type of question that
we have studied before.
Consider the simple scenario depicted in Fig. 7: a public Yes/No question is
asked in a single-agent structure. As the relevant events, we have chosen two
abstract epistemic signals that model the two possible answers to the question.
The epistemic uncertainty relation connects these two events, since the agent
does not yet know which one will actually occur. By contrast, the issue relation
chosen in this event model does distinguish the answers.
As indicated in Fig. 7, is easy to see, even without formal definitions, that
product update produces exactly the new model that we defined earlier in
Section 3. The same is true for other examples that we discussed earlier.
Simple as this proposal looks, it shows some divergences from DEL.
Observation Versus Prediction Uncertainty In PAL and DEL, epistemic
indistinguishability between events represents observational uncertainty for
agents. In the present setting, there is no observation of possible future answers
yet, and hence the epistemic relation rather models predictive uncertainty.19
Likewise, the issue relation changes its intuitive meaning. The point is not that
answer events are issues by themselves, but rather, the issue relation in an
event model makes agents aware of possibilities for resolving questions in a
future answering move.20 We could call this the highlighting function of the
issue relation.
19Likewise, in games, ‘future ignorance’ about a next move is not lack of observational power
about moves so far, but uncertainty about what will happen.
20The issue of awareness also has syntactic aspects that we discuss briefly later on.
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Distinguished Sets of Worlds While the initial epistemic model usually has
one actual world, there is no such distinguished world in our question-event
model. No possible answer is distinguished at this stage. Therefore, we will use
a version later where models can have sets of distinguished worlds or sets of
distinguished events—a generalization that has also been considered for DEL
itself. An answer event becomes distinguished once it has actually been given:
we will return to representation of answers in the next subsection.
Two Kinds of Preconditions Answer events have the precondition that their
content is true. But in addition, we also saw that questions themselves may
have preconditions, such as ignorance of the answer. Should these be rep-
resented in the event model? One option is to have the precondition as
a separate announcement before the product update, another option (less
intuitive, but sometimes convenient) would be to copy the precondition of the
whole question into the preconditions for each answer.
With this simplest setting in place, we turn to more complex cases beyond
what most logics of questions can handle. These include:
• Mixtures of prediction uncertainty and observation uncertainty. An agent
knows that some question is asked, but does not know exactly what that
question is: it could be either p? or q?.
• Genuine privacy. An agent hears the question p?, but another agent thinks
that nothing happened.
We now formulate a mechanism that can deal with such scenarios, that are
ubiquitous in daily life and our natural communicative practice.
5.2 Product Update for Questions
It is time for a precise model that can account for the above phenomena. In
order to do this, we use the following event models:
Definition 14 An action structure E = 〈E, a∼, a≈,pre〉 has the following:
– E is a set of events (possible future answer events),
–
a∼ are equivalence relations on E (prediction uncertainty),
–
a≈ are equivalence relations on E (issue highlight relation),
– pre : E → LELQm is a precondition function mapping events e ∈ E to
formulas of the relevant epistemic issue language LELQm .21
21There is a ‘parametrization’ here to some appropriate language for specifying preconditions.
This language can be a propositional base logic of factual assertions, the richer static epistemic
issue language of Section 2.2, or even the full dynamic language LELQm of Section 5.4 below. The
latter choice involves a slightly delicate issue of mutual recursion, but since it is similar to that for
DEL in general, we do not discuss it here.
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Fig. 8 Intuitive dynamics for asking more indistinguishable questions
Here is how these structures transform given epistemic issue models:
Definition 15 For M = (〈W, a∼, a≈, V〉, w), and E = (〈E, a∼, a≈,pre〉, e) the up-
date product M ⊗ E = ME⊗ = (〈W⊗, a∼⊗ ,
a≈⊗ , V⊗〉, (w, e)) is defined by:
– W⊗ = {(w, e) | w ∈ W, e ∈ E, M |=w pre(e)},
–
a∼⊗= {((w, e), (w′, e′)) | w,w′ ∈ W, e, e′ ∈ E, w a∼ w′, e a∼ e′},
–
a≈⊗= {((w, e), (w′, e′)) | w,w′ ∈ W, e, e′ ∈ E, w a≈ w′, e a≈ e′},
– V⊗(w, e) = V(w).22
Now we give some examples demonstrating how this mechanism works. We
start with two earlier desiderata:
Example 2 (Uncertainty About the Question) Figure 8 depicts a scenario
where a question is asked but, as far as the observing agent is concerned, the
content of the question could be either p or q.
Example 3 (Radical Privacy) Figure 9 depicts a question that is not noticed
by an agent, who thinks nothing happened. This involves mistaken beliefs of
agents. Hence, epistemic relations need no longer be reflexive—but as with
DEL, this changes nothing essential in the product update mechanism.
We end with one more example, now involving two agents essentially:
Example 4 (Privacy in Multi-Agent Scenarios) Figure 10 shows how product
update computes an intuitive result in a scenario where different agents have
different information about the content of a public question.
For technical details, and alternative versions of the mechanism, cf. [21].
22If we need to work with sets of distinguished events, as indicated earlier, we take all pairs of an
earlier distinguished world plus any answer event supported by it.
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Fig. 9 Intuitive dynamics for radical privacy about questions
5.3 Discussion
These examples raise some further issues that we state briefly here.
Special Event Models for Questions Questions are just a particular type of
event, and a more realistic treatment might capture them as a subclass of the
above event models, using the earlier examples as a guide. For instance, it
seems plausible that answers to observation-distinguishable questions should
be prediction-distinguishable, and further constraints are easily found. We
leave a fuller treatment of these issues to future investigation.
Modeling Answers as Separate Events In Section 3, answers to questions ϕ?
were not modeled separately—though one might think of announcements ϕ!
or ¬ϕ! as answer events. An answer might be modeled explicitly as an event
model with its own presuppositions: for instance, an answerer communicates
that she does know the answer. But also, answering involves selection of one
possible answer as the actual one, removing the earlier prediction uncertainty,
though perhaps subject to observation uncertainty. It is easy to model such
scenarios with our machinery.
Further Issue Management Actions We have not discussed counterparts to
our earlier actions of Resolution and Refinement (cf. Section 3) that went
beyond simple questions and answers. These require modifications of our
product update rule that we do not pursue here.
Fig. 10 Product update for a scenario in which b knows that the content of the question is p? but
a considers that the content might have been q?
Toward a Dynamic Logic of Questions 657
The Role of Syntax: Formulation and Protocols Our treatment here has been
semantic, identifying propositions with sets of worlds in the usual manner.
Thus, the two questions (p ∨ p)? and p? will have exactly the same effects, and
can be considered the same.23 This ignores the role of syntactic formulation in
inquiry, and more modestly, in the appropriateness of answers to a stated ques-
tion. But actually, product update also suggests a more syntactic viewpoint,
where the answer events are actual linguistic formulations of answers. This
syntactic perspective will be developed in Section 6 below, when discussing
protocols that constrain avenues of investigation.
5.4 Complete Dynamic Logics for Product Update
The preceding dynamics can be described in a language extending our systems
from Section 3. We add dynamic modalities over event models:
Definition 16 (Dynamic Language) Formulas of the dynamic epistemic issue
language LELQm are constructed by the following inductive-syntax rule:
i | p | ⊥ | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ ψ) | Uϕ | Kaϕ | Qaϕ | Raϕ | [E]ϕ
Definition 17 (Semantics) Formulas are interpreted with this key clause:
M |=w [E]ϕ iff M ⊗ E |=w ϕ.
The resulting dynamic epistemic logic can be axiomatized by standard
techniques, in terms of reduction axioms for event modalities:
Theorem 6 (Completeness) The dynamic epistemic issue logic of product up-
date is completely axiomatizable.
Proof We merely state a few relevant principles:
















23Technically, the reason is that our logic cannot detect differences in models up to epistemic-issue
bisimulation.
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We have shown how the technique of product update allows for a drastic
extension of modeling power for inquisitive scenarios. Our treatment is by
no means complete,25 but it may show how current ‘logics of questions’ can
undergo the same broadening that epistemic logic has experienced in DEL.
6 Temporal Protocols for Inquiry
Our final topic is another recent theme from dynamic-epistemic logic, viz.
longer-term temporal perspective and ‘procedural information’ (cf. [17]).
Single announcements usually only make sense in a longer-term temporal
perspective of some ongoing informational process: a conversation, an exper-
imental protocol, a learning mechanism, and so on. To make this procedural
information explicit, [29] introduces protocols into dynamic-epistemic logic.
This results in modified versions of the public announcement logic PAL, which
now encode procedural as well as factual and epistemic information.26
But the same considerations apply to questions, perhaps even more so. Not
everything can be asked, because of social convention, or limitations on our
measuring apparatus, or financial resources. Thus, it makes sense to adapt our
dynamic logics to a protocol setting, and we will show how this can be done,
resulting in a more realistic theory of inquiry.
We first present several settings where temporal restrictions on questions
make sense. We do this in some detail, to show a crucial dimension of questions
and inquiry that is often ignored in the literature.
Restrictions on Types of Questions Clearly, there are strong restrictions on
the kinds of question that can be asked in realistic inquiry. We measure ‘little
things’ in science, such as readings of instrument panels, and try to get insights
24Here we use the following notation: E?
a∼ E′? if and only if EE? = EE′?, a∼E? = a∼E′?, a≈E? =
a≈E′?,preE? = preE′? and ∀e, e′ ∈ Q∗E? ∪ Q∗E′? : e
a∼ e′ & e a≈ e′ ⇔ e = e′, with Q∗E? a distinguished
set of events representing the actual question, as discussed before, and, E! a∼ E′! if and only if
EE! = EE′ !, a∼E! = a∼E′ !, a≈E! = a≈E′ !,preE! = preE′ ! and e∗E!
a∼ e∗E′ !.
25See [21, 28] for technical improvements of the approach sketched here, with more complex
questioning and resolution action models capturing further realistic features. These include a pre-
cise way of lifting uncertainty between answers to indistinguishability between action models for
questions, and a product update rule that takes into account both issue and uncertainty relations
and their intersection. There are also various kinds of resolution actions having preconditions
expressed in a language that describes the structure of the issue, thus linking answers to previous
questions.
26As a technical side-effect, the original reduction axioms no longer do all the work, as procedural
information may be irreducible. Completeness proofs become more complex.
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about larger issues. Thus, in a logic setting, we may only be able to ask about
atomic questions p?, and not about very complex formulas ϕ?. The same is
true in conversation: we are usually restricted to simple questions that are
easy to understand. More generally, we can think of this as a logical hierarchy,
from factual questions to epistemic ones (‘Did you know that ...?’) to complex
procedural ones (‘What would your sister say if I asked her what I just asked
you?’).
These things can be demonstrated even in the simple setting of propositional
logic. Atomic questions may take more time to reach a goal than more complex
ones. Figure 11 gives a very simple illustration. This figure also demonstrates
another interesting aspect. Information Theory measures information bit con-
tent in terms of the number of factual Yes/No questions needed to determine
the real situation—but it has no restriction to just atomic questions. Thus, one
may sometimes need more atomic questions than the usual bit measure would
indicate.
Procedural Constraints on Questioning Even if the available types of question
are fixed, there can be further procedural restrictions, having to do with access
to experimental devices.
Consider a classical mathematical ‘Weighing Problem’ like the following:
“You have 9 pearls, 1 lighter than the others that are all of equal weight.
You can weigh only 2 times with a standard balance.
Find the lighter pearl.
The admissible questions are fixed in this protocol: we can only ask Nature
for some atomic balance facts. The resulting process can be pictured in an
Fig. 11 Complex experiments
versus atomic questioning
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Fig. 12 Procedural restrictions in the number of available questions
‘event tree’ of possible histories of successive weighings. Figure 12 illustrate
a few successful evolutions, but there could also be ‘bad’ ones.27,28
Restrictions from Epistemic Properties of Inquiry Even if types of questions
and procedural restrictions are fixed, there may still be further relevant
restrictions in multi-agent scenarios. In games, for instance, it might be of
crucial importance in what temporal order new knowledge is obtained. If the
competition finds out the actual world ahead of time, there is no incentive for
sharing resources in a social experimental procedure.
All these aspects show how dynamic logics of questions suddenly get a much
richer field of study than single linguistic speech acts, or information-theoretic
question scenarios where anything goes.
Some Formalities The preceding examples can be formalized in an epistemic
question protocol logic that borrows largely from [29] and [17]:
Definition 18 (DELQ Protocol) Let  be an arbitrary set of epistemic events
(management actions). Let ∗ be the set of finite strings over  (finite histories
27For instance, asking (7/8)? after (789/123)? is a history that fails to solve the problem in two
steps, and hence it would be a bad protocol.
28By the way, here is the solution to this Weighing Problem: “Weigh 3 pearls against 3, leaving 3
pearls aside. If the result is equal, then weigh 2 of the the remaining 3 pearls against each other.
If these are equal, then the remaining pearl is the lighter one—if not, then you know which one
was lightest. If the initial result was unequal, apply the previous procedure to the lighter group of
3: weigh 2 of these, and you will know.”
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of questioning events). A questioning protocol is a set H ⊆ ∗ (containing all
non-empty finite histories and all their prefixes, or every rooted sub-history, or
each initial segment) such that:
FinPre−λ(H) = {h | h = λ, ∃h′ ∈ H : h  h′} ⊆ H
Next, we can set up a formal language over these structures. Crucially, in
the truth definition, dynamic modalities now state that there exists a next
informational or issue action available at this stage by the current protocol
whose execution makes the postcondition true.
The construction in the following definition considers only sequences wσ
such that w is a world in the domain of the initial model M, and σ , σ ′ are
sequences in the state dependent protocol Q(w); σn denotes the sequence σ
up to its n-th position and σ(n) denotes the n-th element in the sequence.
Definition 19 (Q-Generated Model) Let M = 〈W,∼,≈, V〉 be an arbitrary
model and let Q be an arbitrary DELQ-protocol over M (a prefix-closed set
of finite sequences of questioning events). The Q-Generated Model at level n,
MnQ = 〈WnQ,∼nQ,≈nQ, VnQ〉 is defined by induction on n as follows:
1. W0Q = W, ∼0Q = ∼, ≈0Q = ≈, V0Q = V;
2. wσ ∈ Wn+1Q iff w ∈ dom(M), σ ∈ Q(w), len(σ) = n + 1, and wσn ∈ WnQ;
3. If σ(n+1) = ϕ?, then:
(a) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ∼n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1), and (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ∼nQ;
(b) (wσ, vσ ′)∈≈n+1Q iff σ(n+1) =σ ′(n+1), (wσn, vσ ′n)∈≈nQ, (wσn, vσ ′n)∈
ϕ≡MnQ ;
4. If σ(n+1) = !, then:
(a) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ≈n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1), and (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ≈nQ;
(b) (wσ, vσ ′)∈∼n+1Q iff σ(n+1) =σ ′(n+1), (wσn, vσ ′n)∈∼nQ, (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ≈nQ;
5. For each a ∈ P unionmulti N, Vn+1Q (a) = {wσ | wσ ∈ Wn+1Q , w ∈ V(a)}.29
The class of structures Forest(TDELQ) consists of all models Forest(M, Q) for
some arbitrary model M and some arbitrary TDELQ protocol Q.
29We include here only questions and resolution actions to save space. Other management actions
can and should be considered. For instance, here is how clauses for announcement and refinement
look:
If σ(n+1) = ϕ! then: (a) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ≈n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1) and (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ≈nQ; (b) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈
∼n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1), (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ∼nQ, and (wσn, wσ ′n) ∈
ϕ≡MnQ ;
If σ(n+1) = ? then: (a) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ∼n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1), and (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ∼nQ; (b) (wσ, vσ ′) ∈
≈n+1Q iff σ(n+1) = σ ′(n+1), (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ≈nQ, and (wσn, vσ ′n) ∈ ∼nQ;
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Using the construction from the previous Definition 19 we define the
corresponding temporal structure.
Definition 20 (Generated ETL Model) Let M = 〈W,∼,≈, V〉 be an arbitrary
model and let Q be an arbitrary DELQ-protocol over M (a set of finite
sequences of questioning events closed under initial segments). The Generated
ETL Model Forest(M, Q) = 〈H,∼,≈, V ′〉 is defined as follows:
1. H = {h | there is a w ∈ W, σ ∈ Q with h = wσ ∈ Wlen(σ )Q };
2. For all histories h, h′ ∈ H with h = wσ and h′ = vσ ′, h ∼ h′ iff
len(σ ) = len(σ ′), and (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ∼len(σ )Q ;
3. For all histories h, h′ ∈ H with h = wσ and h′ = vσ ′, h ≈ h′ iff
len(σ ) = len(σ ′), and (wσ, vσ ′) ∈ ≈len(σ )Q ;
4. For each a ∈ P unionmulti N, and h = wσ ∈ H, h ∈ V ′Q(a) iff h ∈ Vlen(σ )Q (a).
Next we give a truth definition for a matching dynamic language, with
dynamic actions involving formulas from the static base language only. Here q
is used as a variable over all issue management actions.
Definition 21 (Interpretation) Truth of formulas at state h in models
Forest(M,Q) := Fr(M,Q) = 〈H,∼,≈, V〉 uses these inductive key clauses:
– Fr(M,Q) |=h Kϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ H : h ∼ h′ implies Fr(M,Q) |=h′ ϕ;
– Fr(M,Q) |=h Qϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ H : h ≈ h′ implies Fr(M,Q) |=h′ ϕ;
– Fr(M,Q) |=h Rϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ H : h (∼ ∩ ≈) h′ implies Fr(M,Q) |=h′ ϕ;
– Fr(M,Q) |=h Uϕ iff ∀h′ ∈ H : h = wσ, h′ = w′σ ′, w,w′ ∈ Dom(M),
σ, σ ′ ∈ Q, and σ = σ ′ implies Fr(M,Q) |=h′ ϕ;
– Fr(M,Q) |=h 〈q〉ϕ iff hq ∈ H and Fr(M,Q) |=hq ϕ.
Theorem 7 (Completeness of TDELQ) The dynamic epistemic question logic
T DELQ of protocol models is completely axiomatizable.
This requires an elaborate, but not essentially changed version of the
completeness proof in [17]. The key axioms for T DELQ are in this setting:
Questions & Partition:
〈ϕ?〉Qψ ↔ 〈ϕ?〉 ∧ ((ϕ ∧ Q(ϕ → 〈ϕ?〉ψ)) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ Q(¬ϕ → 〈ϕ?〉ψ)))
Resolution & Knowledge:
〈!〉Kϕ ↔ 〈!〉 ∧ R〈!〉ϕ
The main difference with the earlier reduction axioms is in conjuncts like
〈ϕ?〉. These now express that the action decribed is available according to the
protocol. This procedural information may be sui generis, and not equivalent
to any simple precondition formula in the underlying static language. The new
logic now encodes epistemic aspects, as for PAL and DEL, but also dynamics
of issue structure. Cf. [21] for further details.
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We have shown that dynamic logic of questions can easily accommodate
global temporal protocols, thus getting closer to a true logic of inquiry. Of
course, the main interest is not in our general completeness theorem, but
in analyzing concrete protocols, and more detailed logical effects of various
restricted question repertoires.
7 Further Directions
In this paper, we have shown how dynamic logics of questions can analyze
various aspects of private and public inquiry. These systems fit entirely within
the methodology of dynamic-epistemic logic, and they seem to form a natural
complement to what already exists in this area, making the questions explicit
that drive public announcements and other informational events. In line with
this first finding, many lines of investigation open up:
Some open problems are close to what we have done here. For instance,
we need extensions of our systems to group actions of information and issue
management, including common knowledge, and group issue modalities. We
have also identified an operation of parallel composition of management
actions that needs to be axiomatized. Also, we have raised the open problem
of determining the ‘schematic validities’ behind our dynamic logics, encoding
a more perspicuous algebra of issue management. Next, our extension to
protocols suggests representation results similar to those known for ‘DEL
versus ETL’ in [29] and [8]. And finally, we need to extend our analysis
from Yes/No questions to more complex sorts of questions, such as Wh-
questions asking for a partition cell in some partition that need not be binary
at all.
In addition, we mention a few more general issues on our agenda:
Questioning Games An interesting further development links our dynamic
analysis of questions to epistemic games for public announcements by Ågotnes
and van Ditmarsch [1]. In such games players have to find optimal announce-
ment in order to reach their, possibly conflicting, epistemic goals. In [1] new
solution concepts are proposed for such games, in which the value of a question
gets a precise definition. In strategic interactions an optimal question need not
be the most informative one, and different preferences may arise in different
scenarios. See [2] for a further study of this connection.
Questions, Decisions and Information Another connection, with both infor-
mation theory and decision theory, defines the ‘value of a question’ as its role
in resolving decision problems by means of the information contained in the
available answers. These aspects were introduced and discussed, for instance,
in [35–37]. This connection can become even more relevant in a setting that
makes explicit use of both an information partition and issue-structure for the
answers considered relevant by an agent.
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Further Agent Attitudes: Beliefs and Preferences We have studied the inter-
action of questions with knowledge. But of course, agents’ beliefs are just as
important, and we can also merge the preceding analysis with dynamic logics
of belief change. In fact, in addition to conveying hard information, asking a
question can also be a subtle way of influencing beliefs of agents. For instance,
we said earlier that not all questions impart knowledge that the speakers does
not know the answer. But we might say that, barring further information,
they induce a defeasible belief of the audience that this is the case. Thus,
our question dynamics might be added to the DEL-style belief logics of van
Benthem [26] and Baltag and Smets [6].
Beyond beliefs, questions can also affect other agent attitudes. For instance,
a question can give us information about other agents’ goals and preferences,
and indeed, “Why” questions explicitly concern such reasons for behavior. Just
as information dynamics does not stop at purely informational attitudes, but
also extends to the way in which agents evaluate situations and actions, the
same extension makes sense for questions. This would come out concretely by
adding question dynamics to the preference logics of Girard [9] and Liu [20].30
Update, Inference, and Syntactic Awareness Dynamics While DEL has been
largely about observation-based semantic information, some recent proposals
have extended it to include more finely grained information produced by
inference or introspection. The same sort of move makes sense in our current
setting. For instance, yet another effect of asking a question is of making agents
aware that something is an issue. This does not just make sense in the above
epistemic logic-based environment of semantic information. Raising an issue
may also just make an agent aware that some proposition is important. In
that case, we can think of a finer dynamics of questions, where they increase
some current set of ‘relevant propositions’ whose truth value needs to be deter-
mined. This would work well in the syntactic approach to inferential and other
fine-grained information in van Benthem and Velazquez-Quesada [33], with
questions providing one reason for their acts of ‘awareness promotion’. The
latter take would also fit well with Hintikka’s emphasis on the combination of
questions and deductions as driving inquiry. In a dynamic perspective, merging
semantic observational information and inferential syntactic information will
become even more natural when questions come into play.31
30Indeed, there are formal analogies between our question update operation and the ‘ceteris
paribus’ preferences of van Benthem et al. [30].
31Consider the realization acts defined in [39] but now take a weaker precondition: instead of
requiring that the fact is known we can only ask for the fact to be part of the current issue, or to
have been asked. Instead of using the phrase “Observation enables realization” we can consider a
weaker slogan “Questioning and observation enables partial realization”: [p?][p → q!]〈+q〉Iq.
With these preconditions, a formula can be promoted into the access set even if it was not yet
announced. This would also work in the setting that uses both formulas and rules of inference from
[38] If some premises of a rule have been announced already and the rest are already part of the
current issue, the rule can be applied.
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Multi-Agent Behavior over Time We have already indicated that, just as with
assertions, questions make most sense in the context of some longer temporal
process. A single question is hard to ‘place’ outside of the setting of some
scenario. For instance, questions as much as arguments drive argumentation,
and serve as ways of either underpinning assertions, or calling them into
doubt. To deal with this formally, we need temporal logics that can talk about
sequences of questions and their effects on the current history. Our study of
protocols was one step in this direction, but obviously, we also need to make
our dynamic logics of questions work in analysis of extended conversation, or
especially, games. Another long-term perspective where this makes eminent
sense are learning scenarios, where asking successive local questions would
seem a very natural addition to the usual input streams of answers (cf. Kelly
[19]) to one unchanging grand question which global hypothesis about the
actual history is the correct one.
Structured Issues and Agenda Dynamics Surely, both in conversation and
in general investigation, the agenda of relevant issues is much more delicate
than just some equivalence relation. There are less and more important issues
to be solved. Again, this reflects a point on the informational side, where
logics of ordered propositions have been proposed to model belief revision
and preference ordering. Usually, we are maintaining a ‘structured agenda’—
and it is this agenda that gets modified by successive events of resolving old
questions or raising new ones.
There are already models that allow for this sort of dynamics. Girard
[9] and Liu [20] use ‘priority graphs’ of ordered relevant propositions (first
proposed and studied in Hajnal et al. [3]) for belief and preference change.
Priority graphs can encode a structured family of issues, and they allow for
a larger repertoire of inserting or deleting questions. The cited authors have
suggested that this would be suited for studying the structured agendas of
research programs in the philosophy of science, where theories consist not just
of propositions encoding answers to past questions, but also of a representation
of those guiding questions. True research skills include asking good questions
just as much as giving answers.32
8 Comparisons with Other Approaches
We have mentioned several other approaches to the logic of questions. There
is the tradition of erotetic logic in the sense of Wis´niewski [40], which seems
still relevant. Likewise, it would be good to go back to the slightly later classic
Belnap and Steel [22] in the light of current dynamic logics.
32For intermediate level of agenda representation, cf.the neighborhood models of [32].
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More directly connected to our approach, we have mentioned the still active
program of Hintikka for interrogative logic [15]. Questions are treated here
as requests for new information, which function intertwined with deductive
indicative moves in ‘interrogative tableaux’. There is an extensive theory of
answerhood, as well as an analysis of various types of question in a predicate-
logical setting, beyond what we have done here. The framework has a number
of nice theoretical results, including meta-theorems about the scope of ques-
tioning in finding the truth about some given situation. Clearly, several of these
results would also be highly relevant to what we are doing here, and a merge
of the two approaches might be of interest, bringing out Hintikka’s concerns
even more explicitly in a dynamic epistemic setting.33
Closer to the perspective of this paper, questions have been studied in a
more classical dynamic logic setting in [24] and also [34] as PDL programs that
effect “focus changes” in the structure of an epistemic model. For more details
about this approach and a more extensive comparison, cf. [21].
But the closest comparison to our approach is the current research program
of “inquisitive semantics ([7, 11]).34 Inquisitive semantics gives propositions
an “interrogative meaning” defined in a universe of information states over
propositional valuations, with sets of valuations expressing issues. This sup-
ports a compositional semantics for the language of propositional logic, where,
for instance, a conditional is true in an informational sense if every subset
(stronger information state) supporting the antecedent also supports the con-
sequent. Interrogative meanings are then defined in terms of generalized par-
titions of the set of worlds, where partition cells may now also overlap. This is a
significant extension of the traditional issue picture. Based on this semantics, a
rich new propositional logic arises that describes valid consequence and other
important relations between questions, and for questions and answers. The
program has found a variety of applications to natural language semantics and
pragmatics.
Inquisitive semantics, too, is based on intuitions of information dynamics,
while questions change current partitions, an idea that we have adopted.
And indeed, the two systems are close enough for further flow of ideas:
for instance, can the dynamic logics of this paper be extended to deal with
generalized non-partition issues?35 But there is also a major difference. The
‘inquisitive logic’ matching inquisitive semantics is an intermediate logic with
some intuitionistic, rather than classical features. By contrast, our dynamic
logics are conservative extensions of classical propositional logic with new
dynamic modalities for issue-changing actions. This contrast is not unique to
the current setting (cf. [28]). There are more instances of a duality between
approaches, one “changing semantics” for some standard language resulting in
33A first study in this comparative line is the Master’s thesis [13].
34We cannot do full justice to this fast-growing framework here. For the latest news, see the
website: https://sites.google.com/site/inquisitivesemantics/papers-1.
35Icard [18] explores a first merged version of the two systems.
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a new logic (cf. the intuitionistic approach to information and knowledge [27]),
and one “conservatively extending” a classical system with new operators,
whose logic is then determined explicitly (cf. epistemic logics for knowledge
[25]). In our present setting, the contrast also has to do with the distinction
made at the beginning of this paper between “semantics of questions” for
natural language and “issue management” in general agency. These are related
but not identical concerns, and hence related but not logical systems may
be appropriate. Understanding the precise relations between logical systems
in these two modes can be delicate. Hence undertaking such a comparison
for dynamic logic of questions vis-a-vis inquisitive logic, though clearly very
interesting, goes beyond the bounds of this paper.
9 Conclusion
The dynamic calculi of questions in this paper show how dynamic-epistemic
logic can incorporate a wide range of what we have dubbed ‘issue management’
beyond mere information handling. Our contribution is showing how this can
be done precisely, leading to complete dynamic logics that fit well with existing
systems of DEL. Moreover, we have indicated how these systems can be used
to explore properties of issue management beyond what is found in other logics
of questions, including complex epistemic assertions, many agents, explicit
dynamics, and temporal protocols.36
Even so, we do feel that our systems are only a first step—still far removed
from the complex structures of issues that give direction to rational agency.
The insight itself that issue management is crucial to the logic of inquiry comes
from other traditions, as we have observed, but we hope to have shown that
dynamic-epistemic logic has something of interest to contribute.
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